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ADMINISTRATIVE LAw. Board of Law Examiners: Denial of application.
Plaintiff's application to take the bar examination was rejected by the Board
of Law Examiners. At the Board's hearing, no actual evidence of the moral
unfitness of the applicant was introduced, and the board relied entirely on
undisclosed information in reaching its decision to -reject the applicant.
The applicant was not accorded due process, and the denial of his application
was error.1
Revocation of Hotel License: Review. The statutory provisions for
judicial review of an order revoking a hotel license are adequate to protect
a hotel against a denial of due process. Therefore, a suit to enjoin a hearing
on a rule to show cause why the plaintiff hotel's license should not be
revoked, should have been dismissed where the injunction was sought upon
an alleged denial of due process.3
Unemployment Compensation: Employment availability. The claimant
was not "available for work" 4 and therefore not entitled to unemployment
compensation benefits where it was clearly shown that she was content
to work only a few months during the winter and remain idle during the
summer. The claimant had registered for a particular line of work which
she knew was unavailable during the summer and made no attempt to
find other suitable employment.5
ApELAT PROCEDURE. Certiorari: Final judgment. The order of a
Circuit Court reversing a conviction by a Municipal Court did not finally
determine the cause by giving such judgment or order as the trial court
should have given, and therefore was not of such finality as to support
granting of a petition for a writ of certiorari.8
County Judge's Court: Replacement of judge. Where a Circuit Judge
replaces an absent or disqualified County Judge in a proceeding to have
a person adjudged an incompetent, a judgment rendered is nevertheless a
judgment of a County Judge's Court and the appeal therefrom7 should
be taken to the Circuit Court.8
1. Coleman v. Watts, 81 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1955).
2. FL. STAT. § 511.05 (1953).
3. Florida Hotel & Rest. Comm'n v. Marseilles Hotel Co., 84 So.2d 567 (Fla.
1956).4. FLA. STAT. § 443.05 (3) (1953).
5. Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Ciarlante, 84 So.2d 1 (1955).
6. Miami v. Brown, 80 So.2d 610 (Fla, 1955).
7. FLA. STAT. § 61.01 (1953).
8. In re Freeman's Petition, 84 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1955).
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Madamus. Tile relator had recovered a judgment on certain drainage
district bonds and petitioned for a writ of mandamus to require the district's
supervisors to levy assessments in order that the judgment could be satis-
fied." It was held that the issuance of the writ was proper although the
original authority under which the district was created had expired.'0
Statutory Provisions: Waiver. Defendant twice stipulated that the
plaintiff might have additional timc within which to file her main brief
on appeal. Eighty days after the transcript was filed, the defendant moved
to dismiss the appeal for the failure of the plaintiff appellant to pay the
costs assessed against her in the lower court as provided by statute.'1 Under
these circumstances the defendant had waived his right to insist that the
appeal should be dismissed because of the failure of the appellant to comply
strictly with the statutory provisions 2'-
Summary Judgment. An order granting a motion for summary judg-
ment upon the issue of liability alone, leaving the issue of damages to be
determined at trial,' 3 is interlocutory and may not be the basis for aii
appeal.' 4
Tolling of Time Limitations. A petition for a rehearing in equity,
if timely filed,'3 will toll the running of the period in which an appeal
may be taken.'6
Writ of Prohibition. A defendant who pleads to the mcrits and partici-
pates in the trial of an action after the court overrules an objection to its
jurisdiction over his person, does not thereby waive such objection, and
may challenge the ruling on appeal.' 7 A writ of prohibition, therefore,
may not be used in order to challenge the adverse ruling upon an objection
to lack of personal jurisdiction where jurisdiction of the subject matter
does exist.18
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. Arbitration of Fees. Where an attorney and
his clients contracted to submit any dispute as to fees to another attorney,
such other attorney's determination of the fee was binding upon the clients,
since he was familiar with the services performed, knew the parties, and
was competent to determine a fair fee.'
Recovery of Fees: Collusive settlement. A motion by plaintiff's attor-
neys to continue an action in the name of their client for the purpose of
9. FLA. STAT. § 298.56 (1955).
10. Millican v. State, 84 So,2d 712 (Fla. 1956).
11. FIL STAT, § 59.09 (1953).
12. Berg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 81 So,2d 630 (Fla. 1955).
13. FLA. R.Civ.P. 1.36 (c) (1954).
14. Brannon v. Johnston, 83 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1955).
15. FLA. R.Civ.P. 3.16 (1954).
16. Ganzer v. Canzer, 84 So.2d 591 (Fia. 1956).
17. FLA. R.Civ.P. 1.11 (b) (1954).
18. State v. Shields, 83 So.2d 271 (Fa. 1955).
19. Causeway Loan Co. v. Bucklew, 81 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1955).
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recovering their fees was properly denied where there was no showing that
a settlement entered into by the client was collusive and for the fraudulent
purpose of depriving the attorneys of the full amount of a contingent fee.20
Resignation from Bar. An attorney petitioned the Supreme Court to be
allowed to resign from the Florida Bar, stating in his petition that there
were disciplinary proceedings pending against him. The court held that
the petition could be granted where the resignation was unconditional and
where the public interest would not be adversely affected.2'
CIVIL PROCEDURE. Joinder of parties: Principal and surety. Where a
bond provides that it is the joint and several obligation of the principal
and sureties, an action may be brought against the sureties without joinder
of the principals as parties defendant.22
Joinder of Parties: Supplementary proceedings. An order was entered
stating that a conversion of funds into property held by the judgment
debtor and his wife as tenants by the entireties was fraudulent as to
creditors and that the judgment creditor who had brought the action was
entitled to have levy and execution upon the property. The Supreme
Court held where the wife had not been made a party at the institution
of the proceedings,n she could not be deprived of her interest.24
Judgment: Costs. Trial court erred in imposing the costs of a suit
on the Comptroller and the Attorney General when the suit revealed no
wrongdoing on the part of the defendants and was dismissed?25
Jurisdiction: Federal and state. A subcontractor brought suit against
a general contractor and a surety on its payment bond to recover amounts
due under the subcontract. The surety bond was posted under the Miller
Act 26 which vests in the United States District Court exclusive jurisdiction
of actions on federal building contractors' bonds. The state court had no
jurisdiction over the suit against the surety.27
Pleadings: Summary Judgment. A motion for summary judgment and
and a motion to strike a pleading as being false should never be granted
if there is any substantial evidence to support the pleading and, in ruling
upon such motions, all doubts should be resolved against the moving party.
It was therefore error to grant motions to strike and for summary judgment
where the moving party's affidavit was contradicted to a substantial degree
by the adversary's deposition and affidavits. 28
20. Sentco, Inc. v. McCulloch, 84 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1955).
21. Application of Harper, 84 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1956).
22. Ruth v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 83 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1955).
23. FLA. STAT. § 55.52 (1953).
24. Meyer v. Faust, 83 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1955).
25. State v. Colonial Acceptance, Inc., 80 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1955).
26. 40 U.S.C. § 270(a).
27. Pierce Contractors v. Peerless Cas. Co., 81 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1955).
28. Meadows v. Edwards, 82 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1955).
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Res Judicata: Dismissal. The dismissal of an action for failure to
prosecute29 is not an adjudication upon the merits of such action and will
not bar a subsequent suit based upon the same subject matter.80
Veniremen: Exclusion. A suit arose out of a collision between two
motor vehicles. On voir dire, the plaintiff asked a prospective juror whether
he had an interest in a named insurance company. The defendant im-
mediately moved for a mistrial. It was reversable error for the trial court
to refuse to exclude the veniremen, other than those tentatively chosen
and in the jury box, from the courtroom during the argument on the motion
for mistrial. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Apportionment Bills: Submission to Governor.
Bills for the apportionment of representatives in the Senate and House of
Representatives which are enacted pursuant to the constitutional pro-
visions32 on such subjects, do not, ipso facto, become laws when passed
by the legislature but should be submitted to the Governor for his con-
sideration and his approval or rejection as contemplated by the constitutional
provision"3 pertaining to the Governor's veto power and to passage over
the Governor's veto or without his signature. 4
Appointing Power of Governor: Judges. Although a circuit judge had
disappeared from his home and office under circumstances suggesting foul
play, the Governor had no power to declare the office vacant or to increase
the number of circuit judges by appointing someone to serve in the missing
judge's stead."
Due Process: Hearing. The defendant telephone company was notified
that the telephone facilities of the plaintiff hotel corporation were being
used in violation of the gambling laws." The telephone company notified
the plaintiff that it intended to discontinue service. Suit was brought by
the hotel to enjoin the removal of its telephone facilities and also to
prevent revocation of its licensee7 alleging that the statutes in question
violated due process in that they did not provide for a hearing prior to
the cancellation of service. It was held that an opportunity to be heard
could be afforded through a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the statutes
and that the requirements of due process were thus fulfilled. 8
Police power: Municipal corporation. A municipal ordinance regulat-
ing the size and locations of signs displayed by gasoline filling stations
29. FLA. STAT. § 49.19 (1953).
30. Zukor v. Hill, 84 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1956).
31. Blanton v. Butler, 81 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1955).
32. FLA. CONST. Art, VII § 3.
33. FLA. COqST. Art. III § 28.
34. In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 81 So.2d 782 (Fla, 1955),
35. In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 81 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1955).
36. FLA. STAT. § 365.01 (1953).
37. FLA. STAT. § 561.291 (1953).
38. Southern B.T. & ri. Co. v. Nineteen Hundred One C. Corp., 83 So.2d 865
(Fla. 1955).
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to advertise the price of their products and services was not justified as an
exercise of the police power and was therefore unconstitutional. 0
Self-incrimination: Due process. The disbarment of an attorney based
solely upon his invoking the privilege against self-incrimination in refusing
to answer questions concerning his alleged communist activities is a denial
of due process. 40
CONTRACTS. Brokers: Procuring cause of sale. Pursuant to ordinary
listing contract, plaintiff real estate broker proposed the sale of defendants'
land to the County Board of Public Instruction. A counter-proposal of
the Board was rejected by the defendants and plaintiff was told to dis-
continue negotiations. Approximately two months later, the defendants
sold to the Board under the threat that the land would be condemned by
it if not sold. The broker was held not to be the procuring cause of the
sale and therefore, not entitled to a commission. 4'
Brokers' commissions: Condition precedent. An agreement between a
prospective lessee and lessor provided for the return of an earnest money
deposit and the extinguishment of all obligations under the agreement if
certain conditions were not fulfilled. It was also provided that the brokers
who procured the prospective lessee were not entitled to a commission until
"consummation" of the agreement. Under these provisions the brokers
could not recover a commission where, due to the non-performance of the
specified conditions, no lease was entered into.42
Consideration: Partial Failure. Plaintiffs contracted to build an ice
plant for the defendants which would be capable of producing six tons
of ice daily, but which, when completed, produced only half that amount.
In a suit to foreclose a mortgage given as security for the payment of the
contract price, it was held that a decree of foreclosure should be entered
for an amount based upon the quantum meruit valuation of the plant.43
Offer: Communication. The plaintiff was not entitled to a reward
offered by defendant for information leading to the conviction of the
murderer of defendant's wife where such information was delivered to
the authorities prior to the making of the offer.44
Substantial performance. Defendant had contracted to do certain dredg-
ing and filling on waterfront property owned by the plaintiffs. Defendant
did not bring the fill up to the elevation specified in the contract but it
appeared that part of this deficiency was due to failure on the part of
the plaintiffs to comply strictly with the terms of the contract. It was
held that the rule of substantial performance should be applied and the
39. Town of Miami Springs v. Scoville, 81 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1955).
40. Sheiner v. State, 82 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955).
41. Darracott v. Hemphill, 82 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1955).
42. Kay v. Sperling, 83 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1955).
43. Johnson v. Dichiara, 84 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1956).
44. Sumerel v. Pinder, 83 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1955).
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defendant be allowed to recover the amount of the contract price less
the damages incurred by plaintiffs.45
Usury: Agent's commission. Where a mortgage broker is employed
as the agent of the lender, the amount of the commission exacted by the
broker from the borrower will be included in determining whether or not
the loan is usurious.4 6
CORORATIONS. Receivership: Transfer of debts. A plaintiff who bases
his claim to corporate assets on his stock ownership, and who has accepted
the conveyance authorized by the court in a receivership proceeding because
of his stock ownership, takes subject to the corporate debts but should be
given an opportunity to be heard as to the validity and amount of such
debts. 47
Stockholders: Personal liability. Supplementary proceeding 4 8 were in-
stituted against the stockholders of the insolvent corporate debtor. The
Supreme Court held that the issuance of a rule to show cause why the
judgment should iiot be satisfied out of the individual assets of the stock-
holders was properly refused in the absence of any showing that the stock-
holders held corporation assets or that they organized or conducted the
corporation for a fraudulent purpose.40
Transfer of Assets: Corporate debts. Plaintiff bought up the mortgages
upon the corporate assets of the defendant corporations, then bought the
stock of the corporations, and then, by voting the stock, transferred the
assets to himself as an individual. The Supreme Court held that he took
subject to corporate debts.50
CRIMINAL LAW. Fraud: Issuance of worthless check. In a prosecution
for the issuance of a worthless check,"' it was only necessary that the
state prove the issuance of the check and its deposit and return marked
"insufficient funds." The applicable criminal statute' provides that proof
of the above constitutes prima facie evidence that the instrument was
issued with knowledge that there were insufficient funds out of which
payment could be made.53
Larceny. According to the construction given by the Supreme Court
to a penal statute,-'4 a salesman's copy of a contract is property and can
be the subject of larceny.A5
45. Poranski v. Millings, 82 So.2d 675 (Pla. 1955).
46. Speier v. Monnah Park Block Company, 84 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1955).
47. Scheiner v. Adamco, Inc., 81 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1955).
48. FLA. STAT. § 55.52 (1953).
49. Advertects, Inc. v. Sawyer Industries, 84 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1955).
50. Scheiner v. Adamco, Inc., 81 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1955).
51. VIA. STAT. § 832.05 (2) (1955).
52. Fa. STAT. § 832.05 5) (1955).
53. Shargaa v. State, 84 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1955).
54. FLA, STAT. § 811.021 (1953).
55. Biber v. Miami, 82 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1955).
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Lesser included offenses. The possession of lottery tickets and the selling
of chances in a lottery are lesser included offenses respectively of the felonies
of promoting a lottery by possessing tickets and of having an interest in
a lottery.50
Procedure: Argument. Refusal of a trial court to permit a defendant
who had offered no testimony on his behalf except his own to make the
opening and closing arguments to the jury constituted reversible error.Y
Photographs offered into evidence by a defendant constitute "testi-
mony" within the meaning of a statute giving a defendant who offers no
testimony in his behalf except his own, the right to the opening and the
concluding arguments.' 8 A defendant, by introducing such evidence, forfeits
the right given by the statute.59
Procedure: Double jeopardy. The defendant was charged with stealing
a cow. The state's evidence disclosed that it was a bull that had been
stolen, not a cow as charged. The defendant's motion for directed verdict
based on a material variance between allegations and the proof was granted.
Subsequently a second information charging larceny of a bull was filed.
The plea of former jeopardy was not available to the defendant in the
subsequent prosecution for larceny of a bull since this was not the same
offense as that alleged in the first information. 0
Conspiracy to violate a criminal statute and violation of the statute
itself are separate and distinct crimes. A conviction for the commission
of one will not bar a prosecution and conviction for commission of the
other.6 '
Procedure: Judgment. A defendant may not be adjudged guilty of a
different or greater offense than that for which he is convicted, and
therefore a judgment of conviction for the crime of burglary had to be
set aside where the jury found the defendant guilty of breaking and entering
with intent to commit a misdemeanor. 62
Procedure: Indictment and infornation. An information charging
conspiracy to violate the statute63 prohibiting dissemination of racing data
which did not allege the place of the crime, what the conspiracy consisted
of, what race track was involved, what races were involved, or what days
the races were to be run, failed to state any offense against the laws of
Florida and was void. 64
56. Nelson v. State, 83 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1955).
57. Green v. State, 80 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1955).
58. FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1955).
59. Kennedy v. State, 83 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1955).
60. State v- Bentley, 81 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1955).
61. Blackburn v. State, 83 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1955).
62. Walden v. State, 83 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1955).
63. FLA. STAT. § 550.35 (1955) ----
64. State v. \Vhisnant, 80 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1955).
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Procedure: Sufficiency of wararnt. A warrant describing premises to
be searched as being located in a certain dwelling on a certain street in
Pensacola, Florida, was not insufficient because the premises were in fact
located outside the city limits of Pensacola, since there was only one
street such as that designated in the warrant and there was no evidence
that the officers had difficulty in locating the address described in the
warrant.65
Procedure: Withdrawal of plea. An order refusing to grant a motion
to withdraw a plea of guilty and to substitute one of not guilty will not
be upset upon appeal in the absence of a showing that such refusal was
an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.66
Search and Seizure: Consent. In a prosecution for illegally transporting
alcoholic beverages, the search of a truck without a warrant but with the
consent of the driver was not an unreasonable search despite the fact that
the truck was unlawfully stopped.67
Search and Seizure: Probable cause. Affiant listened on an extension
telephone while a confidential informant called the number listed under
accused's name and purchased from the person who answered an interest
in a lottery. This was sufficient to show probable cause or reasonable belief
or trustworthy information that a lottery was being conducted on the
accused's premises, and to justify the issuance of a search warrant 68
Search and Seizure: Without a warrant. Sheriff, who illegally stopped
defendant's truck and found liquor dripping therefrom, was not entitled
to search the truck without a warrant, since one cannot discern the probable
absence of a revenue stamp by smelling and tasting the whiskey.69
Sentence: Credit for time served. Defendant was convicted upon
retrial for the same crime. It was error for the trial court to sentence him
without giving full credit for the time he served under the void sentence
along with the "gain time" he had eamed.70
Sentence: First offense. Petitioner was found guilty of the unlawful
possession of marijuana and sentenced to eleven years imprisonment. The
maximum sentence for first offenders under this criminal statute was five
years. Since there was no suggestion in the record that this was not a
first offense, the sentence was void.71
DOMEsTic REAmONs. Child custody order: Notice. An order granting
to the father custody of minor children, previously in the custody of the
65. Bonner v. State, 80 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1955).
66. Adams v. State, 83 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1955).
67. James v. State, 80 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1955).
68. Perez v. State, 81 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1955).
69. Byrd v. State, 80 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1955).
70. Tilghman v. Mayo, 82 So.ld 136 (Fla. 1955).
71. Bascelio v. Mayo, 81 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1955).
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mother pursuant to a divorce decree, was erroneous where there was no
notice, or excuse for failure to give notice, to the mother.7
2
Divorce: Constructive service. The test used in divorce actions to
determine whether constructive service may be employed is whether
the complainant reasonably utilized knowledge at his command, made
diligent inquiry, and exerted an honest effort appropriate to the circum-
stances to acquire the information necessary to enable him to effect personal
service, and not whether it was in fact possible to effect personal service. 73
Divorce: Modification of alimony award. A divorced husband petitioned
for a modification of the prior divorce decree74 and was awarded an amended
decree relieving him of the burden of paying alimony "until the further
order of [the] courts." It was held that the amended decree, although
res judicata as to the matters settled therein, did not bar the wife from
subsequently petitioning the court for a reinstatement of alimony.75
Divorce: Ne exeat bond. In a divorce proceeding the surety upon a
husband's ne exeat bond surrendered him in open court and moved for a
discharge of the bond. It was error for the chancellor to deduct sums
from the bond for the payment of costs and attorneys' fees when it was
not shown that the husband had passed from the jurisdiction of the
court.76
Divorce decree: Recordation. Although, by statute," no proceedings
may be had upon an equity decree until it is recorded, the mere lack of
recordation does not impair the efficacy of a decree otherwise valid. Thus,
a divorce decree signed by the chancellor shortly before the death of one
of the parties, but recorded afterwards, was effective to dissolve the
marriage.78
Separate maintenance: Subsequent divorce. An Alabama divorce decree
awarded a husband upon service by publication was held not to affect
the alimony provisions of a prior separate maintenance decree obtained
by the wife in Florida. 79
Support payments: Default. A Florida rule 0 provides for the enforce-
ment of final decrees by authorizing a writ of attachment ordering the
delinquent party to be taken into custody, to be issued upon an affidavit
filed by the plaintiff that specific acts ordered by the decree have not been
compiled with. The rule is not applicable to default on payments ordered
by a divorce decree for the support of children.81
72. Abney v. Abney, 84 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1956).
73. Grammer v. Grammer, 80 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1955).
74. FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1955).
75. James v. James, 84 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1956).
76. Aiken v. Aiken, 81 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1955).
77. Fx. STAT. § 62.16 (1953).
78. Berkenfield v. Jacobs, 83 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1955).
79. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 82 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1955).
80. FLA. R. Ctv. P. 3,15 (1954).
81. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 80 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1955).
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EQUITY. Mistake: Improvements to land. Plaintiff, intending to build
a dwelling on his lot, mistakenly built upon an adjacent lot owned by the
defendant. The two lots were substantially the same and the chancellor
decreed that the parties exchange deeds to the prospective lots and that
plaintiff pay to defendant $150 and costs. The decree was affirmcd. 82
Mutual mistake: Land. Plaintiff and defendant each purchased separate
tracts of land from the same owner, and owing to a mistake of fact under
which all the parties labored, a house which plaintiff believed was acquired
in his purchase was actually situated on the land of the defendant. It was
held that the plaintiff should be given a reasonable length of time in
which to remove the building upon the condition that he compensate the
defendant for any damage to the freehold resulting from the removal.,"
Unfair business practices. It is a well settled principle of equity juris-
prudence that an employee cannot lawfully use for his own advantage and
to the harm of his employer confidential information which was gained
in fle course of employment. The state court, sitting in chancery, therefore
had jurisdiction to entertain a suit to enjoin former employees from ]nanu-
facturing, imitating, or selling the plaintiff's product, notwithstanding the
fact that the plaintiffs could have brought suit in federal court for infringe-
ment of their patent rights.8 4
Unfair competition: Trade names. Plaintiff sold bread under the un-
registered trade name of "Dandy" and brought suit to enjoin defendant
from marketing bread under the name of "Dandee." It was held that the
injunction was properly refused where the evidence did not indicate that
there existed in the minds of the public any confusion of the two products.85
EvWErNCE. Hearsay: Admission. In a suit to recover for personal in-
juries sustained in an automobile accident, it was reversible error to admit
evidence that the defendant's employee had pleaded guilty to a reckless
driving charge and had admitted responsibiiity for the accident.86
Illegally obtained evidence: Injunction. An action was brought to enjoin
state officers from testifying against plaintiffs in the United States District
Court and to restrain the sheriff from turning over to the federal authorities
contraband evidence secured from a search and seizure on plaintiff's
premises with a search warrant that was later quashed. The plaintiffs
were not entitled to such an injunction in the absence of a showing of
unusual circumstances or irreparable loss or damage to plaintiffs' property
or other rights necessary to justify such intervention by the state court.891
82. Voss v. Forgue, 84 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1956).
83. Hedges v. Lysek, 84 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1955).
84. Bert Lane Company v. International Industries, 84 So2d 5 (Fla. 1955).
85. Webb's City, Inc., v. Bell Bakeries. 226 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1955).
86. Kaplan v. Roth, 84 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1956).
87. Weiner v. Kelly, 82 So.2d 155 (Fla. 1955).
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* Subsequent repairs. In an action to recover for personal injuries
sustained as the result of a fail brought about by an alleged defect in
defendant city's sidewalk, evidence that the city had subsequently repaired
the defect was inadmissible, although the defendant's counsel had remarked
to the jury in his opening statement that the condition constituting the
alleged defect never existed.88
FLORIDA TAXATION. I-omestead exemption. Plaintiff husband and wife,
owners of a home, quit same because the husband was recalled to active
duty in the armed forces of the United States. Since the plaintiffs con-
tinued in good faith to consider the vacated premises as their home to
the exclusion of all other places, they were entitled to the homestead
tax exemption thereon.89
Improvement Bonds: Airport. Airport improvement bonds which were
to be retired from proceeds obtained from renting concessions at the
airport, from occupational and beverage licenses, and from the county's
share of state race track receipts were valid. An approving vote of the
freeholders was not required as a condition precedent to the issuance of
the bonds since they wvere payable from sources other than ad valorein
taxes.90
Improvement bonds: Ad valorem assessments. A proposed improve-
ment district bond issue provided that the bonds would be liquidated by
specially assessing all real property within the district and that such
assessments would be based upon the assessed valuation of such property.
It was held that since there was no showing that the assessments would
bear any relationship to the benefits that would accrue to the property
through the improvements, the bond issue in reality provided for an ad
valorem tax against homesteads 1 and was therefore, invalid"12
Licenses: Alcoholic Beverages. A statute9 3 provides that the population
limitation regarding the issuance of beverage licenses does not apply to
restaurants occupying an area greater than four thousand square feet. The
external measurements of the building are to be used in computing area
under this statute. 4
Licenses: Nurses. Nurses are not included within the scope of a
statute 5 imposing a license tax upon persons "engaged in the practice
of a profession." 98
88. City of Miami Beach v. Wolfe, 83 So,2d 774 (Fla. 1955).
89. L'Engle v. Forbes, 81 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1955).
90. State v. Monroe County, 81 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1955).
91. FLA. CONST. Art. X § 7.
92. Fisher v. Board of County Comm'rs of Dade County, 84 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1956).
93. FLA. STAT. § 561.20 (1,2) (1953).
94. McKinney v. State, 83 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1955).
95. FLA. STAT. § 205.52 (1953).
96. Lambert v. Mullan, 83 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1955).
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Municipal Assessments: Description of Property. A statute97 charges all
owners of property with notice that taxes thereon are due annually and
further charges the owners with the duty of ascertaining the amount of
such tax. Therefore, a suit may not be maintained to invalidate certain
municipal assessments on the ground that the description of the property
on the tax rolls was so fatally defective that the taxpayer could not be held
to have had knowledge of the assessments. 8
INSURANCE. Agent's commissions. In the absence of an express pro-
vision to the contrary, an insurance agent does not have any right to
commissions upon premiums paid for policy renewals not secured by
him.09
Cancellation: Notice. Where an insurance policy provides that the
insurer may cancel the policy by the mailing of a notice of cancellation,
convincing evidence that the notice was mailed may not be rebutted by
evidence that the insured did not receive same' 00
Claims: Attorney's fees. Two persons entered claims against the de-
fendant insurance company for the proceeds under a life insurance policy.
It was held that the trial court committed error in assessing attorney's
fees' 0 ' against the company in favor of the successful claimant where there
was no "wrongful" refusal on the part of the insurer to pay the proceeds
of the policy.'02
Liability policies: Obligation to defend. Under a property liability
insurance policy, the insurer was not obligated to defend and pay the
costs of an equity action in which a mandatory injunction was sought. The
court held that, under the terms of the policy, the insurer was obligated
to defend only damage suits brought against the insured 02
LABOR LAw. Fair Labor Standards Act: Applicability. Defendant, a
bakery with an annual business exceeding one million dollars, furnished
$57,500 in baked goods to a catering company. The caterers used one
third of the baked goods purchased from defendant for the preparation of
flight meals sold to airlines for use on planes leaving the state. Defendant's
employees were engaged in "production of goods for interstate commerce"
within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act.'
Picketing: Appoinment of Commissioner to hold election. In a suit
to enjoin picketing of plantiff's hotel on the ground that the picketing
97. FLA. STAT. § 92.21 (1953).
98. Thompson v. City of Key West, 82 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1955).
99. Frank 0. Pruitt, Inc. v. Southern Underwriters, 83 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1955).
100, Service Fire Insurance Co. of New York v. Markey, 83 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1955).
101. FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1953).
102. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Nichols, 84 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1956).
103, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955).
104. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1938);
Mitchell v. Royal Baking Company, 219 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1955).
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was for an unlawful purpose, it was improper for the chancellor to enter
an order appointing a commissioner to hold a secret ballot among the
plaintiff's employees for the purpose of determining how many of them
chose the defendant union as their lawful representative. 10 5
Picketing: Conditional injunction. The lower court entered an order
enjoining picketing and providing for an election among the employees
to determine their bargaining agent. The employer applied for a stay
of the latter part of the order and the lower court granted a stay of the
entire order. It was error for the lower court to impose the requirement
that the injunctive portion of the decree be also cancelled as a condition
to granting supersedeas as to the portion of the order appealed from.106
Picketing: Unlawful purpose. Picketing for the purpose of forcing
an employer to negotiate with a union is unlawful where the union has
not been chosen by at least some of the employees as their bargaining
agent, and where an opportunity has not been afforded the employer to
engage in negotiations upon the subject matter of the dispute. 07
LANDLORD AND TENAN'r. Failure to repair premises: Damages. The
lessors of a hotel breached an agreement to maintain the roof and walls
of the building in such condition as to prevent the entry of water into
the building. The lessee was able to recover as damages the difference
between what the rooms could have been rented for had the lessors not
breached, and the amount for which the rooms had actually been rented. 0 8
Mechanics' Liens: Lessor's interest. Where a lessee procures certain
alterations or improvelments to be made on the leased premises, the
mechanics' lien which is created does not extend to the lessor's interest
unless the lease or some other agreement requires the lessee to have such
work done. 109
Wrongful eviction: Damages. A lessee who has an established business
disrupted by his wrongful eviction may recover lost profits where such
losses may be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty." 0
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Bonds: Offstreet parking facilities. Suit
was brought to validate revenue bonds to be issued by a city to finance
the acquisition and improvement of off-street parking facilities. It was
determined that the city had the power to pledge the revenue to be
realized from existing parking facilities to pay the principal and interest
of the bonds, without having to submit the issue to the freeholders.'"
105. Thomas Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel Employees Union, 84 So.2d 583 (Fla.. 1956).
106. Thornas Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel Employees Union, 81 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1955).
107. Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Employees Union, 83 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1955).
108. Rosen v. Needelnan, 83 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1955).
109. Brenner v. Smullian, 84 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1955).
110. Young v. Cobbs, 83 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1955).
111. Lynn v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 81 So.2d 511 (Fla. 1955).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Contracts: Ratification. An agreement between a city and the state
board of control to furnish water to the University of Florida without
charge was not void and was ratified by both the city and the state by
furnishing free water for 45 years. 1'2
Liability: Negligence. The plaintiff's residence was adjacent to the
defendant city's ball park where a major league baseball team was permitted
to conduct its practice sessions. Each day, youthful spectators would
organize themselves into gangs for the purpose of chasing and retrieving
baseballs hit outside of the park. The plaintiff was injured by one of
these groups of baseball retrievers whose practice it was to knock down
any person interfering with their objective of recovering the baseballs.
It was held that the city would be liable if it were shown that it knew
or should have known of this condition and that it failed to take the
proper precautions to prevent same." 3
Ordinances: Charter requirements. The ordinances of a municipal
corporation are of no effect unless the provisions in its charter regarding
the passage of ordinances are strictly complied with. Thus, a liquor ordi-
nance was held ineffective where it was not passed by the taking of "yeas
and nays and entered upon the journal" as required by the charter." 4
Subdivisions: Public Improvements. A city insisted that the owner
of a suddivision construct a sewage system beneath the dedicated streets
of the city. The city did not reserve the right to use the system or to
allow others to do so, and the city neither claimed nor exercised control
over the system. The property owner who had installed the system had
the exclusive right to use same.""
Tax Liens: Sale. Municipal tax liens may be enforced by the sale of
delinquent tax certificates at public auction""0 or in the alternative by
foreclosure of the certificates. 17 Therefore a city board of managers had
the authority to pass a resolution preventing the sale of delinquent tax
certificates at public auction in order to make it possible to foreclose
same.118
PERSONAL PROPERTY. Chattel Mortgages: Lienor's rights against third
party. Plaintiff held a retain title note against .tn automobile which was
damaged in a collision with a truck owned by defendant's insured. De-
fendant was notified of the plaintiff's interest in the vehicle, but never-
theless, it made settlement with the conditional vendee. This settlement
112. City of Gainesville v. Board of Control, 81 So.2d 514 (tla. 1955).
113. Woodford v. City of St. Petersburg, 84 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1955).
114. Nelson v. State, 83 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1955).
115. Newport Manor v. Carmen Land Co., 82 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1955).
116. FLA. STAT. §§ 193.01, 194.01 (1953); Spec. Laws of Fla., c. 15401, §
101 (1931).
117. FLA. SEAT. § 173.01 (1953).
118. City of Ormond Beach v. Cook, 81 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1955).
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was held to be a bar to an action by the conditional vendor where it had
notice that defendant might effect a settlement with the vendee and where
it failed to take appropriate action to protect its interest." 9
Chattel Mortgages: Subsequent purchaser. His failure to comply with
a statute 20 requiring purchasers of out-of-state cars to make inquiries to
discover whether any liens have been recorded against the car deprived
the purchaser of the right to plead that he was an innocent purchaser
for value, without notice of the recorded mortgage, even though both the
title certificate and the mortgage bore an incorrect motor number.' 2 1
RFAL PROPERTY. Deeds: Construction. Where, in a deed, there is
ain apparent inconsistency between the granting and the habendum clauses,
the entire instrument will be considered in order to determine the true
intention of the grantor. Thus, the habendum of a deed was held to have
indicated that the true intention of the grantor was to convey only a life
estate although the granting clause contained the customary words of
inheritance.122
Eminent Domain. Valuation of land. The amount of compensation
to be awarded for land taken in an eminent domain proceeding is the
value of the land at the time of the lawful appropriation. Evidence as to
what it would be worth if certain improvements were made on it is
inadmissible.1 2a
Foreclosure: Breach of covenant to repair. A mortgagee could not
foreclose for breach of a covenant to keep the building on the mortgaged
premises in repair where it was not shown that his security had been
impaired . 24
Foreclosure: Parties. Suit was brought to foreclose a mortgage on
property, the title to which was in the wife, given as security for a note
executed by both husband and wife. The complaint was amended to base
the action upon a note which husband alone had subsequently executed
for the amount then due on the original note. The Supreme Court held
that failure to produce the original note or to explain the failure to do
so precluded the entry of a decree of foreclosure against the wife. 1 25
Highways: Obstruction. A non-resident of a county brought suit to
enjoin the obstruction of a public road within the county. The plaintiff
owned no property along said road and there was an equally accessible
road available for his use. The Supreme Court held that he had no
right to maintain the suit. 28
119. Lake City Auto Finance Co, v. Waldron, 83 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1955).
120. FLA. STAT. § 319.27 (1953).
121, Clinger v. Reliable Discount Co., 80 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1955).
122. Bronstein v. Bronstein, 83 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1955).
123. Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1955).
124. St. Martin v. McGee, 82 So,2d 736 (Fla. 1955).
125. Downing %, First National Bank, 81 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1955).
126. O'Dell v. Walsh, 81 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1955).
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Improvements to another's land: Measure of compensation. The
measure of compensation for improvements to the land of another made
in good faith by one in possession under color of title was the amount
by which such improvements had enhanced the value of the owner's estate,
less the reasonable rental value of the land for the period of possession by
the improvement maker.12
7
Judgments: Statutory requirements. A judgment which did not describe
by metes and bounds, or otherwise locate the property which it sought
to return to plaintiff did not comply with the requirement of the statute1 28
governing judgments in such actions and therefore was reversed." 9
Liens: Materialman. Generally under an ordinary contract of sale
which may permit construction by the purchaser, the lien of a materialman
in privity only with the vendee does not attach to the vendor's interest.
However, where the previous owner of property required that the purchaser
construct cabins upon the property as a condition of sale, the previous
owner's interest in the property was subject to the liens incurred in the
construction of the cabins. ' 0
A materialnan could not claim a lien against the defendants' real
estate where the defendants had relied upon the materialman's rcceipted
bill and release of lien which were executed by him when he received
payment by means of the contractor's worthless check' 3 '
Tenancy in common: Contribution. XVhere one co-tenant of real estate
paid the mortgage thereon which was the obligation of both and neither
had a prior duty of performance, the payor-co-tenant could recover in equity
but was limited to his right of contribution.13 2
ToRTS. Child's wrongdoing: Parental liability. A complaint against
parents for injuries sustained by reason of their child's tort in slamming
a door against a hotel employee's hand and severing a finger did not state
a cause of action against the parents because it failed to allege that the
child was in the habit of slamming doors in similar situations. 3 3
Damages: Pain and suffering. The application of the "present worth"
rule to future pain and suffering is incorrect. No standard exists by which
to measure damages for pain and suffering except the enlightened conscience
of impartial jurors.' 3 4
Invasion of privacy: News media. A telecast was made of a "canned"
film which depicted a raid upon an alleged gambling establishment. The
127. Arey v. Williams, 81 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1955).
128, FLA. SrAT. § 70.05 (1955).
129. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Robbins, 81 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1955).
130. Tremont Co. v. Paasche, 81 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1955).
131. Leyman v. Snyder, 84 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1955).
132. Meckler v. Weiss, 80 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1955).
133. Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 19551.
134. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 80 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1955).
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appearance in the film of the plaintiff, an innocent bystander, was not an
unreasonable or unwarranted invasion of his privacy. 135
Libel. A magazine distributing company was not liable for an alleged
defamatory article appearing in a magazine which it distributed where
it had no knowledge that the magazine contained the libelous matter. 146
Malicious prosecution. Plaintiff's judgment in a malicious prosecution
suit was affirmed where successive civil actions based upon the same cause
of action were filed against the plaintiff by the defendant after a previous
judgment, which should have settled the controversy, had been rendered
against the defendant. 137
Negligence: Attractive nuisance. Plaintiff, a two and a half year old
child, was injured by an artificial condition existing upon the land of
another and created by defendant contractor. It was held that the child
had a cause of action against the contractor based upon the attractive
nuisance doctrine."58
Negligence: Contributory fault. Plaintiff brought action against city
for the death of her husband. Deceased, a carpentcr, was walking along
the ridge of a pitched roof, which he was measuring with a steel tape held
by a spool, and was electrocuted by contact with defendant's uninsulated,
high voltage electric wires. Decedent was not as a matter of law guilty
of contributory negligence and the issue was properly submitted for deter-
mination by the jury.""
Florida law requires that a driver of a motor vehicle operate it so
that he can control or stop it within the range of his vision. The plaintiff,
who was injured when he collided with the defendant's negligently parked
truck, was guilty, therefore, of contributory negligence as a matter of law
where his headlights should have revealed the truck 40 so that, if he had
been attentive, he could have safely avoided it."'
Decedent was killed while attempting to pass defendant's truck, which
was parked in a traffic lane at night without flares or warning devices.
Decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence. 142
A driver, proceeding on a through street and observing the lights of a
car approaching a stop sign at the entrance into the street on which he
was traveling, was not required to act on the presumption that the other
driver would not stop to let the car on his right proceed. 4
135. Jacova v. So. Radio and Television Co., 83 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
136. Sexton v. American News Co., 133 F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Fla. 1955).
137. Trueman Fertilizer Company v. Stein, 84 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1956).
138. Cockerham v. R. E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1955).
139. City of Williston v. Cribhs, 82 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1955).
140. FLA. STAT. § 317.58 (1955).
141. Geigy Chemical Corp. v. Allen, 224 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1955).
142. Townsend Sash Door and Lumber Co. v. Silas, 82 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1955),
143. Yappa v. Bennett, 80 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1955).
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Negligence: Guest Statute. An airplane mechanic was injured while
riding on a fuel truck, according to the customary practice, for the purpose
of directing the placement of trucks fueling airplanes. The Supreme Court
held that the mechanic rode on the truck for the nmtual advantage of
himself and the driver and that therefore the guest statute' did not
apply- 1Mr5
Negligence: Invitees. Defendant requested plaintiff to keep watch over
a workman as he inspected bars recently installed in defendant's home.
Defendant did not inform plaintiff of a difference in the floor levels of
two of the rooms in the house and plaintiff fell and was injured. Dc-
fendant's failure to inform plaintiff of the difference in elevation of the
two rooms did not constitute negligence. 46
Negligence: Physicians and surgeons. A patient brought suit against
his physician for alleged malpractice in the treatment of cancer. The
treatment failed to alleviate plaintiff's condition, and physician discharged
him without arranging for or suggesting other medical attention or different
treatment. The physician breached his duty to the patient by failing to
inform him at the earliest possible time that the prescribed treatment was
ineffective and the only hope of recovery lay with other types of treatment. 47
Defendant physicians applied steaming hot towels to the arm of plain-
tiff's newly born child in order to revive her circulation in that limb. The
heat pack treatment caused the arm and hand to be burned to such an
extent that the child lost her fingers and thumb. In affirming a judgment
for the plaintiff the court held that the question involvcd was not whethcr
the defendants used the proper treatment under the circumstances, but
rather whether the treatment used was applied in a non-negligent manner." 8
Negligence: Standard of care. Plaintiff was injured when she walked
across a grass strip of parkway inside a curb and tripped over a water
meter box which protruded two inches above the ground. The Supreme
Court held that neither the city nor the water company was required to
exercise as great a degree of care for the safety of pedestrians in parkways
as it would have had to exercise for their safety on the streets and side-
walks."'O
Negligence: Violation of ordinance. The violation of a municipal
ordinance relating to passing at intersections, like violations of other traffic
laws or regulations, is only prima facie evidence of negligence and may be
overcome by proof to the contrary.' 50
144. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1955).
145. Sproule v. Nelson, 81 So.2d 478 (Fin. 1955).
146. Hoag v. Moeller, 82 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1955).
147. Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1955).
148. Montgomery v, Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
149. Drarmstadt v. West Paln Beach, 81 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1955).
150. Gucdath v. Culp Lumber Co., 81 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1955).
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Strict Liability: Respondeat superior. Defendant corporation was not
liable for injuries inflicted upon a business invitee by a vicious animal which
an employee kept on defendant's premises without its knowledge.' 1
Wrongful Death: Imputation of negligence. A father may not recover
for the death of his minor child 152 where the death was proximately con-
tributed to by the negligent conduct of the mother and where the father
should have known of such conduct.'
Wrongful death: Inability to sue. A wife's legal inability to sue her
husband is not a bar to an action under the Wrongful Death Act'5 4 by
the wife's surviving minor children against the estate of her husband, who
had murdered her and then committed suicide. 55
Wrongful death: Statute of limitations. Wife brought action against
city for the wrongful death of her husband. A statute'56 required that actions
against a city for negligence or wrongful injury to person or property
must be commenced within 12 months from the time of the injury. This
provision does not apply to actions for wrongful death since such actions
are neither injuries to person or property but are a distinct right to recovery
created by statute.'
TRUST AND SuCCESSioN. Estates: Creditors' claims. Executrices who
failed to file objections to a creditor's claim against the estate could not
thereafter resist the claim on the ground that it was barred by the statute
of limitations. 58
Estates: Dower. The decedent had sold his interest in a partnership
to his former partners under an agreement that upon his death any
indebtedness owned by him to the partnership would be offset against
the balance due him from the partners for the sale of his interest. A
statute which provided that dower be free from all liability for the decedent's
debts' "9 entitled the widow to one third of the entire amount due the
decedent from his former partners, exclusive of the sum due the partner-
ship. 10
Estates: Time for filing claims. A statute' 6' specifying the time in
which claims against an estate must be filed does not apply to one attempt-
ing to enforce a beneficial interest in trust property held by the estate.
151. Dickson v. Graham-Jones Paper Co,, 84 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1955).
152, FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1955).
153. Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
154. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01, 768.02 (1955).
155. Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1955).
156. FA. STAT. § 95.24 (1955).
157. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01, 768.02 (1955); Parker v. Jacksonville, 82 So.2d 131
(Fla. 1955).
158. Coggin v. Shanley, 81 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1955).
159. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1955).
160. In re Payne's Estate, 83 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1955).
161. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1955).
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Thus, a suit by the beneficiary of a resulting trust was not barred, though
instituted after the running of the statute.' -
Wills: Ademption. Subsequent to the execution of his will, the testator
entered into a contract to sell the subject matter of a specific devise to the
devisees. The devise was thus held to be adeemed and the devisee pur-
chasers were not relieved of their obligation under the contract to pay
the balance of the purchase price.'O"
Mutual Wills: Construction. A husband and wife executed a mutual
will wherein it was provided that "in the event death do (sic) not occur
to the both of us simultaneously in a common disaster or in the event
one of us should not survive the other for a period of more than one
calendar month," the will was to be void. Taken with other provisions
of the will, this paragraph was construed to mean that the will would
not take effect unless its makers died as the result of a common disaster,
either simultaneously or within thirty days of each other. The will was
therefore declared void where the husband and wife died within thirty
days of each other from natural causes. 0 4
Wills: Precatory expressions. A provision in a will directing that a
particular person act as attorney for the personal representative of the
estate is merely precatory in nature. The personal representative may
therefore refuse to employ the attorney named in the will and may select
another of his own choosing.' 5r
Wills: Unprovided for contingency. The testator had devised and
bequeathed his entire estate to his two stepsons providing that in the
event a stepson should predecease him, the children of such stepson would
take their deceased father's share. A stepson and his children were killed
in an accident prior to the death of the testator. This contingency was
not provided for in the will. It was held that the sole remaining beneficiary
under the will was not entitled to his deceased brother's share but that
such share should pass by intestate succession to the heirs of the testator.' 66
WoKMEN's COMPENSATIoN. Award: When due. A Florida statute07
entitles workmen's compensation claimants to an additional twenty percent
award where the original award "is not paid within fourteen days after it
becomes due." For the purposes of this statute the award becomes due
upon the day it is entered. 08
Course of employment: Dual purpose. An employee is entitled to
workmen's compensation benefits where he is injured while engaged on
162. Hodges v. Logan, 82 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1955).
163. Eisensehenk v. Fowler, 82 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1955).
164. Meszaros v. Holsberry, 84 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1956).
165. In re Marks' Estate, 83 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1955).
166. In re Eltzerotb's Estate, 83 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1955).
167. FLA. STAT. § 440,20 (6) (1953).
168. Rutherford v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 83 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1955).
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a mission which serves both a business and a personal purpose, regardless
of whether the buiness purpose is dominant or not. 69
Definition of employment. The plaintiff sold the products of a cutlery
compaiiy from a counter in defendant's store. The plaintiff was on de-
fendant's payroll, and defendant withheld federal taxes, old age benefits,
etc., from her compensation. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff was
defendant's employee and that any rights she had against defendant for
injuries sustained in the store were limited by the Workmen's Compensa-
tion law.' 70
Review: Fulfillment of time requirement. A petition for review of an
order of a state industrial commission, which had been mailed on the
59th day after the entry of the order but not received by the court within
the 60 day statutory period,17' was dismissed.172
Review: Statement of facts. An employee appealed from an order deny-
ing compensation. The Supreme Court held that where the Deputy Com-
missioner failed to set forth a proper statement of the facts relied upon
to determine the case, as required by statute,' the case must be remanded
for compliance with the statutory requiremcnts. 174
Review: Tolling of statutory period. The 60 day period for filing a
petition for certiorari to review an order of the Florida Industrial Com-
mission was not tolled by filing a petition for rehearing when there was
neither a valid rule nor a statute authorizing the filing of such a petition. 7 5
169. Cook v. Highway Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1955).
170. Yovan v. Burdines, 81 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1955).
171. FLA. Sup. CT. Rule 16 (1) (1955).
172. Columbia Cas. Co. v. MeFee, 81 So.2d 631 (Fla. 1955).
173. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(3)(c) (1953).
174. Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, 81 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1955).
175. Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Nolan, 80 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1955).
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